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ABSTRACT: The dialectical approach to teaching critical thinking is centred on a comparative evaluation 
of contending arguments, so that generally the strength of an argument for a position can only be assessed 
in the context of this dialectic. The identification of fallacies, though important, plays only a preliminary 
role in the evaluation to individual arguments. Our approach to fallacy identification and analysis sees fal-
lacies as argument patterns whose persuasive power is disproportionate to their probative value. 
KEYWORDS: critical thinking, argumentation, dialectical context, reasoned judgment, comparative evalu-
ation, fallacy identification, probative value, rhetorical effect, dialogue, responding to fallacies 
1. INTRODUCTION: THE DIALECTICAL APPROACH 
The dialectical approach to teaching critical thinking has as its goal enhancing students’ 
ability to make reasoned judgments based on an appropriate inquiry into an issue. We 
have argued elsewhere for an approach to critical thinking instruction which focuses on a 
dialectical approach (Bailin & Battersby 2009; Battersby & Bailin 2010a; Battersby & 
Bailin 20101b) and have instantiated such an approach in our textbook, Reason in the 
Balance: An Inquiry Approach to Critical Thinking (Bailin & Battersby 2010). This type 
of inquiry involves identifying and assessing the relevant pro and con arguments on an 
issue. Such an assessment of arguments must usually be based on the completion of the 
inquiry and a comparative evaluation of the arguments. The assessment of the weight or 
import of even individual arguments cannot usually be done apart from the context in 
which the arguments are situated. Generally, in order to know how good an argument 
really is, one has to evaluate it in its dialectical context. Judging how strongly a particular 
set of premises supports a conclusion frequently requires more information than that sup-
plied in the particular argument. For example, an assessment of the argument that capital 
punishment deters and that therefore we should bring back capital punishment requires 
not only a careful examination of the evidence for the deterrence claim, but also a deter-
mination of how well the argument from deterrence, even if true, stands up against coun-
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ter arguments to capital punishment such as the problem of the execution of the innocent. 
Neither of these arguments is fallacious and the complex assessment of their contribution 
to the question of whether we should have capital punishment requires considering them 
and other relevant arguments pro and con (see Battersby & Bailin 2010a, 2010b). 
2. PRIMA FACIE EVALUATION 
Thus the identification of fallacies in individual arguments usually cannot, in itself, con-
stitute an adequate evaluation of the strength of the argumentative support for a claim. 
Fallacy identification can, however, play a subordinate and preliminary or prima facie 
role in argument assessment. Although prima facie judgments cannot be definitive about 
the cogency of an argument, judgments about the fallaciousness of an argument can often 
be made with considerable confidence. Thus certain arguments can be eliminated from 
further consideration. 
 As an example, the argument that we should support capital punishment because 
there is a long standing tradition of executing murderers can be evaluated and identified 
as committing a fallacious appeal to popularity or tradition. This provides a basis for not 
giving consideration and weight to this argument in further considerations of the balanc-
ing of pros and cons. 
 The identification of fallacies also plays a crucial role is ensuring that inquiry 
dialogues are kept on track and thus contributes to arriving at a reasoned judgment in 
dialogue situations. Participants in a reasonable dialogue will attempt to avoid making 
fallacious arguments and should be able to identify and not be distracted or persuaded by 
fallacious arguments made by others. Nonetheless, coming to a reasoned judgment as a 
result of a thoughtful exchange of views involves much more than avoiding and identify-
ing fallacious arguments. As with any inquiry, the reasoned judgment must be made by 
weighing the strength of contending arguments.
1
 
3. ACCOUNTS OF THE NATURE OF A FALLACY 
While our view of fallacies places them in a more subordinate role in argument evalua-
tion than is typical in most approaches to informal logic, we still maintain that the identi-
fication and understanding of fallacies plays an important role in inquiry. Our characteri-
zation of fallacies departs somewhat from many standard accounts, however. 
 While traditional accounts associated fallacies with invalidity, informal logicians 
have moved the analysis away from deduction. In an extensive review of developments with 
respect to the conceptualization of fallacies, Hansen (2002) offers the following summary: 
The survey impresses upon us not only that the ontological component of fallacies as argu-
ments is very firmly entrenched in the tradition (83%), it also shows that the psychological 
component, that a fallacy appears to be a better thing of its kind than it really is, is widely 
supported (61%). Although the fallacies tradition does not support HHC , it does support a 
kindred generalization: a fallacy is an argument that appears to be a better argument of its 
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  For a discussion of the process of and considerations involved in such a weighing, see Battersby &  
Bailin (2010a). 
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kind than it really is. No one, however, I believe, has articulated what it is to be a fallacy ex-
actly this way (Hansen 2002: 152). 
This idea that fallacies appear to be better arguments than they really are is a central in-
sight about the nature of fallacies, and one which is also elaborated by Walton. In com-
menting on his own work as well as that of the Pragma-dialecticians, he makes the fol-
lowing observation: 
The two most fully developed theories of fallacy so far (Tindale, 1997) are the pragmatic 
theory (Walton, 1995) and the pragma-dialectical theory (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 
1992). According to the earlier version of their theory, a fallacy is a violation of a rule of a 
critical discussion where the goal is to resolve a difference of opinion by rational argumenta-
tion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992). […] According to the pragmatic theory (Walton 
1995, 237-238), a fallacy is a failure, lapse, or error that occurs in an instance of an underly-
ing, systematic kind of wrongly applied argumentation scheme or is a departure from accepta-
ble procedures in a dialogue, and is a serious violation, as opposed to an incidental blunder, er-
ror, or weakness of execution. […] The problem is that neither theory has fully taken into ac-
count that longstanding intuition, very much evident in Aristotle’s treatment of the sophistici 
elenchi, that fallacies are deceptive. They are not just arguments that prejudice efforts to resolve 
a difference of opinion, wrongly applied argumentation schemes, or departures from acceptable 
procedures in a dialogue, although they are all that. They are arguments that work as deceptive 
stratagems. They are arguments that seem correct but are not (Walton 2010: 279). 
In an attempt to address why it is that fallacies seem correct but are not, Walton suggests 
that the concept of heuristic may provide an explanation. He notes that the heuristics in-
volved are inferential tendencies which by and large serve us well, but which also can on 
occasion lead to unwarranted inferences. The work of Amos Tversky and Kahneman (cit-
ed above) has demonstrated how these heuristics can lead to unwarranted inferences, 
while the work of Gigerenzer (1999) and others has shown how these “simple and frugal” 
heuristics can often lead to reasonable, if tentative conclusions (Walton 2010).  
 According to Walton’s new analysis, the fallacy results from using a heuristic 
which is often appropriate but is not a reliable guide for the case in question.  In our view, 
fallacies are indeed arguments which seem correct but are not. Our characterization of 
fallacy attempts to capture and build on this insight. We further agree with Walton that 
heuristics could indeed be one of the sources of fallacious reasoning. We would argue, 
however, that they are by no means the only source.  
4. OUR ANALYSIS OF FALLACIES  
We define a fallacy as an argument pattern whose persuasive (rhetorical) power greatly 
exceeds its probative value (i.e., evidential worth). 
 Probative value, as it is used in law, is the legal weight or evidential worth that a 
piece of evidence should be given when making a judicial finding. Evidence of high pro-
bative value includes items such as DNA and finger prints; items of low probative value 
are items such as hearsay or observations done under poor lighting conditions. Important-
ly, courts sometimes refuse to hear evidence even though it has probative value.
2
 The 
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 In R. v. B., Justice Maclachlin wrote: 
 "The analysis of whether the evidence in question is admissible must begin with the recognition of the 
general exclusionary rule against evidence going merely to disposition.... (E)vidence which is adduced 
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refusal to hear this evidence is based on the court’s belief that the evidence is too “preju-
dicial” i.e., the evidence’s persuasive power greatly exceeds its probative value. A good 
example of this is the prohibition on similar fact evidence. Similar fact evidence is evidence 
that the accused has committed previous crimes that were similar to one that he is currently 
charged with. In our text we illustrate the court’s concern with the following example: 
… let’s imagine that “Bill” is accused of using a ladder to get to the second story balcony of 
an apartment and then entering through the unlocked door and stealing a television set. Being 
caught with the stolen television set would have strong probative value for his guilt (of 
course he might have been given it, so it is not conclusive evidence). On the other hand, if it 
turns out that Bill has been convicted of breaking into the second floor of apartments before, 
you might think that this too is relevant evidence.  
 But such similar fact evidence is usually not allowed to be presented to the court, not 
because it has low probative value, but because it is too persuasive. A jury (perhaps even a 
judge) on hearing that the accused has been convicted of a similar crime will be strongly in-
clined to find this evidence very persuasive. Too persuasive.  But from a probative point of 
view, this evidence is very weak because Bill’s particular method of crime is very common 
and could have easily been used by someone else. The crime he is accused of is not only sim-
ilar to his past crimes, but similar to crimes committed by many others, meaning that the sim-
ilar fact pattern has low probative value.  But because this evidence carries so much more 
persuasive power than probative value, the courts generally prohibit the presentation of such 
evidence (Bailin & Battersby 2010:63). 
We can illustrate how our concept of fallacy works by applying our analysis to an exam-
ple from one of the dialogues in our text:  
McGregor: Your friend Lester is typical of people on the minimum wage. He lives at home 
with his parents. I don’t see why he needs a lot of money, except for frivolities like beer and 
movies. So raising the minimum wage will just be helping a bunch of well off kids have more 
spending money. Hardly a good way to help the poor (Bailin & Battersby 2010: 62). 
The tendency, illustrated by McGregor, of confidently asserting a generalization based on 
one example is the common fallacy of anecdotal evidence. Note that McGregor’s exam-
ple is not irrelevant to the generalization about minimum wage workers -- after all, this is 
a case supporting his generalization. Individual experiences are often relevant to support-
ing a generalization and can play a key role in refuting generalization. Thus such appeals 
to personal experience usually have some probative value. The problem is that humans 





 The fallacy results from taking very limited evidence that is subjectively 
powerful and persuasive and crediting it as if it strongly supports a generalization.  
                                                                                                                                                 
solely to show that the accused is the sort of person likely to have committed an offence is, as a rule, in-
admissible. Whether the evidence in question constitutes an exception to this general rule depends on 
whether the probative value of the proposed evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect." 
 In Sweitzer, Justice McIntyre of Canada Supreme Court wrote: 
 "... where similar fact evidence is tendered ... its admissibility will depend upon the probative effect of 
the evidence balanced against the prejudice caused to the accused by its admission whatever the purpose 
of its admission."  http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/S/SimilarFactEvidence.aspx 
3
  Extensive research by Tversky, Kahneman and others on the assumption of representativeness supports 
this observation. People expect their experience to be representative just as they expect a sequence of 
dice roles to look like a random distribution. See Tversky & Kahneman (1974). 
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 To return to Walton’s analysis, this instance could be seen as a misapplication of 
the representativeness heuristic described by Tverksky and Kahneman, exactly fitting the 
pattern identified by Walton. We would argue, however, that “natural” heuristics are just 
one source of persuasiveness that can lead to crediting arguments grossly in excess of the 
probative value of the reasons presented.  In this case, the power of anecdotal evidence 
also comes from the compelling power of narrative.  Both these rhetorical factors con-
tribute to the tendency to give undo weight to what is after all a very small and biased 
sample. Fallacies are not just created by the misapplication of heuristics, but also by any 
factor which causes the argument to be significantly more persuasive than warranted by 
its probative value. As Walton noted in an earlier paper, emotional appeals are also an 
aspect of many fallacies: “Emotional appeals are not necessarily fallacious arguments, 
but when they do become categorized as fallacies, it is because they are weak and irrele-
vant moves in argument” (Walton 1987: 330). 
 What he fails to note is that in a fallacious argument, the emotional appeal 
(which we take to be an example of the argument’s non rational but persuasive appeal) 
tends to exceed whatever probative value is present in the argument. In the article on the 
ad hominem from which this quotation is taken, he notes that many cases of circumstan-
tial ad hominem remarks about the author are relevant, especially when they provide a 
basis for raising doubts about the reliability of the claims of the author:
 
 
This type of ad hominem argument can be reasonable in some cases because inconsistency of 
an arguer's position should reasonably be open to criticism or questioning. However, it can 
become fallacious if the arguer's statement is rejected too strongly, or if the issue is evaded 
(Walton 1987: 327). 
Why then is it a fallacy? Because what is usually inferred from the attacks on the propo-
nent’s motivation and circumstances is that the position and arguments of the proponent 
can simply be dismissed. The effect of persuading the listener to dismiss the argument is 
the rhetorical effect. The ad hominem tends to produce a confident dismissal of an argu-
ment which is not warranted despite whatever probative value can be given to the cir-
cumstantial considerations regarding the author.   
5. APPLYING THE ANALYSIS TO FORMAL FALLACIES 
This same analysis of a fallacy as an argument whose persuasive power greatly exceeds 
its probative value can also be applied to formal fallacies,  e.g., affirming the consequent, 
as can be demonstrated by the following simple example: 
(1) If the car runs, then it has fuel 
(2) The car has fuel 
(3) Therefore it will run 
This argument also exhibits the characteristic of having some probative value -- in this 
case the second premise does provide some support for the conclusion. But when pre-
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  In a recent exchange on Argthry we were invited to share our impressions of the status of critical thinking in 
post secondary education.  Few could resist the temptation of sharing anecdotes, with the suggestion, either 
explicit or implicit, that these stories and impressions constituted reasonable evidence for a generalization. 
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sented as a deductive argument with the truth of the premises supposedly guaranteeing 
the truth of the conclusion, it is fallacious. The fact that the car does have fuel has proba-
tive value for the claim that it will run, but offered as a deductive argument, its rhetorical 
effect is to give an unwarranted air of certainty where it should only convey probability. 
6. PEDAGOGY 
Given our analysis of fallacies, we describe each fallacy in our text as having two as-
pects: 1. “logical error” – an explanation of why the argument has limited or no probative 
value, and 2. “rhetorical effect” – an explanation of why the argument has a tendency to 
be persuasive. The most common effect of a fallacious argument is to induce a level of 
conviction unwarranted by the probative value of the argument.  Sometimes the rhetorical 
effect is also destructive of an effective dialogue, producing not only unjustified convic-
tion, but derailing the whole dialogue from its purpose.  Thus, even if the claim (e.g., that 
someone is motivated by sexism) is likely, the effect on the dialogue is to switch it to a 
discussion of the participant’s motives and away from the issue in question. We insist on 
the identification of both aspects of a fallacy because failure to understand the rhetorical 
aspect of the fallacy makes a person less able to resist its siren call and more likely to 
miss the reasoning error that is the basis of the fallacy. 
 Note that we are not claiming that all of these rhetorical aspects are necessarily 
intentional or even intentionally misleading. That is why we describe these fallacious 
rhetorical moves as rhetorical effects not strategies. Fallacious arguments can, and per-
haps often are, made intentionally. But we have all slid into fallacious reasoning uninten-
tionally. Who has not over generalized from a single experience?  
 To see how this analysis works, we excerpt from our text our description of the 
ad hominem.  
AD HOMINEM:  
Arguers commit the fallacy of ad hominem if they reject a proponent’s argument on the basis 
of critical remarks about the proponent rather than the proponent’s argument To be clear, not 
any personal attack is guilty of the ad hominem fallacy. The fallacy is committed only when 
the remarks about the proponents are used as grounds to inappropriately dismiss their argu-
ment. 
Rhetorical Effect: Discredits an argument by attacking the author’s background and behav-
iour and shifts the argument to the author and away from the issues at hand. In a dialogue, 
such a move often leads to the author defending their personal behaviour or background in-
stead of staying focused on the issue at hand. The use of the ad hominem is especially detri-
mental to conducting a dialogue because it not only distracts from the issue at hand, but it al-
so tends to inflame people’s emotions. 
Logical Error: If the author has presented credible evidence and arguments, the proponent’s 
background or behaviour is largely irrelevant to the logical worth of the argument. When ar-
guments are presented, the issue must be decided on the merits of the argument, not on the 
qualities of the author.   
The situation is different if the proponent is claiming that we should accept their argument 
because of some fact about them, such as being an expert in the field. In such cases, evaluat-
ing the source of the argument can be relevant. What makes ad hominem remarks fallacious 
is not that facts about the author are always irrelevant, but rather that we usually tend to give 
such claims too much weight when assessing an argument—they have more persuasive im-
pact than probative value. (Bailin & Battersby 2010: 65) 
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We also note that some considerations about the author’s circumstances can be legiti-
mate, illustrating our general point that what makes ad hominem arguments fallacious is 
the excessive degree to which people find remarks about an author a basis for dismissing 
their argument. But information about the author is sometimes relevant because it can 
form part of the basis on which we decide to trust the author’s claims or believe that cru-
cial counter arguments have not been ignored. As Walton notes above, one can and 
should use knowledge of a person’s likely biases to inform the process of evaluation of 
their arguments (Walton 1987). 
7. RESPONDING TO FALLACIES 
Another role of fallacy identification in a dialectical approach to critical thinking is its 
role in guiding an effective response. For fallacy identification to be a useful tool in rea-
soning and dialogue participation, a student also needs to be able to use this identification 
to respond effectively. While this understanding is useful in writing responses to argu-
ments, it is especially crucial to have an effective means of responding to fallacies in a 
dialogue. Teaching students to identify fallacies and their rhetorical effect provides them 
with the means for preventing fallacious arguments (intentional or not) which may lead 
the discussion off the rails.  
 The key to responding to fallacies effectively is 1) to notice the rhetorical effect 
and resist its temptation, 2) to recognize the logical error, and 3) to address the logical 
error in a manner that supports the continuation of a respectful exchange of views. In the 
case of many fallacies, the key is not to be distracted by arguments of limited or no rele-
vance and to keep the discussion on topic. Effective responses identify the fallacy without 
name calling and keep the discussion focused on the issue in question. 
 Below are suggestions from our text on how to respond to the ad hominem.  No-
toriously people respond to personal attacks in an argument by defending themselves 
against the attack (“I am not a hypocrite. While only yesterday…”) instead of returning to 
the issue in question. This is why it is important to identify the rhetorical impact of a fal-
lacy (“I am being attacked, which will distract me from the issue”). The responses below 
illustrate a variety of ways of responding that keep the discussion on track: 
 Yes, he may seem to you to be crazy (neurotic, upset), but still he has a point. 
The arguments he made seem pretty good to me. 
 Even if she does work for the …., is friends of…, is married to…, you still have 
to listen to her point. I mean she made a pretty good argument about… 
 This isn’t about me. The issue is …         (Bailin & Battersby 2010: 206) 
8. CONCLUSION 
While fallacy identification plays primarily a preliminary and subordinate role in our view 
of critical thinking as inquiry, we still provide students with a somewhat novel and, we 
believe, powerful method for identifying and analyzing fallacies. Moreover, while not relat-
ing fallacy identification directly to the violation of dialogic rules, we do emphasize the 
need to identify, avoid. and respond effectively to fallacies that occur during a dialogue. 
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Commentary on “FALLACY IDENTIFICATION IN A  
DIALECTICAL APPROACH TO TEACHING CRITICAL 
THINKING” by Mark Battersby and Sharon Bailin. 
JAN ALBERT VAN LAAR 
Faculty of Philosophy 
University of Groningen 




In the dialectical approach of Mark Battersby and Sharon Bailin, teaching critical think-
ing has as its goal “enhancing students’ ability to make reasoned judgments based on an 
appropriate inquiry into an issue.” In their paper, they focus on the role of fallacy identi-
fication in enhancing this ability. The central idea is that fallacy identification is an im-
portant part of the evaluation of arguments, but that it does not exhaust it. I agree with 
their view, and try to add to their case by way of three critical comments. First, I shall try 
to make it plausible that, contrary to the authors’ view, fallacy analysis does not play a 
merely preliminary or subordinate role in the evaluation of an argumentative text or 
speech. Second, I shall elaborate on my position that fallacy analysis does not always suf-
fice when evaluating argumentation, not because fallacy analysis would be insufficiently 
sensitive to the dialectical context, but rather because there are argumentative norms, the 
violation of which do not constitute fallacies, but rather argumentative weaknesses or in-
stitutional faults. Third, I shall contend that fallacy identification should be supplemented 
with the dialectical testing of the alleged identifications of fallacies. 
2. THE ALLEGEDLY PRELIMINARY ROLE OF FALLACY ANALYSIS  
The authors point out that fallacy identification can play a “subordinate and preliminary 
or prima facie role in argument assessment” but that it does not suffice for arriving at an 
adequate evaluation, which is required for a reasoned judgment, for the reason that “the 
reasoned judgment must be made by weighing the strength of contending arguments.” 
The authors’ argument suggests that they use a notion of fallacy, according to which it is 
possible to identify all the fallacies in a text or speech, without having taken the complete 
dialectical context into account.
1
 
 However, it is plausible that fallacies can be committed in the final stage of a 
discussion, in which the merits of both contending sides are weighed in an attempt to find 
                                                 
1  Battersby and Bailin define “fallacy” as “an argument pattern whose persuasive (rhetorical) power 
greatly exceeds its probative value (i.e., evidential worth).” An undesirable consequence of this defini-
tion seems to be that an argument must be judged fallacious in case it has a low probative value and a 
great persuasive power (“for the intended audience,” I would add), even if the protagonist of this argu-
ment is completely honest about the low probative value of the argument and does not in any way ex-
ploit the disposition in the addressed audience to overestimate the argument’s probative value. 
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out whether or not the standpoint at hand has been successfully defended. Part of the 
pragma-dialectical model of an ideally critical discussion, for example, is a concluding 
stage in which the parties attempt to find out whether the initial differences of opinion 
have been resolved, and if so, in whose favor. This stage is governed by a rule that states, 
among other things, that a protagonist is not allowed to maintain his standpoint if the an-
tagonist has conclusively attacked the standpoint.
2
 Thus, in order to put forward a sus-
tainable judgment to the effect that a protagonist is recalcitrant in this specific manner, 
the evaluator must make a survey of all the critical responses put forward by the antago-
nist, as well as of the ways in which the protagonist has responded to them. This implies 
that the contending arguments of the antagonist addressed must also have been taken into 
account. Of course, the evaluator may dismiss an argument, or a different kind of contri-
bution to the dialogue, as a fallacy as a preliminary verdict, before having considered the 
full dialectical context, but when doing so, she merely anticipates on what she expects to 
be her final assessment. A similar analysis applies to the fallacy of failing to retract one’s 
critical doubt after having been provided with a conclusive defense of a standpoint.
3
 To 
conclude, at least some fallacy judgments require an extensive knowledge of the contend-
ing arguments, and therefore the assumption of Battersby and Bailin, to the effect that an 
evaluator may first identify the fallacies within individual arguments, and then proceed to 
determine the strength of the contending arguments, cannot be upheld unconditionally.
4
 
 Fallacy identification can play a prima facie role in argument evaluation. Never-
theless, they also must play an important role in the final stages of argument evaluation, 
when the merits of each of the positions in the discussion are added up and weighed 
against each other. This suggests that the analysis of fallacies is important in preliminary 
as well as in more advanced stages of inquiry dialogues that aim at reasoned judgments.  
3. BEYOND FALLACY ANALYSIS 
I agree with the authors that the dialectical context must be closely examined when evaluat-
ing an argument. As we have seen, one reason is that a sustainable judgment to the effect 
that a move is fallacious sometimes requires extensive knowledge of the dialectical context. 
Another reason is that a full-fledged evaluation goes beyond an analysis of the fallacies. 
 The evaluation of an argument is the activity in which it is determined whether, 
and if so, to what extent, an argument conforms to a chosen set of standards, or norms, or 
rules, or to an ideal or desired state. I assume that argument evaluation is best carried out in 
the light of a specification of an argumentative ideal by way or three kinds of norms 
(Krabbe and van Laar 2011). First, there are rules for critical discussion, which distinguish 
between speech acts (among which arguments) that are legitimate, in the sense of being 
instrumental to the resolution of disputes, and those that are not legitimate. The latter 
speech acts are defined as fallacies (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004). For example, 
                                                 
2  This is stated in Rule 14 (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004: 154). The meaning of “conclusive at-
tack” is defined in Rule 9 (p. 151). 
3  This is, in the pragma-dialectical view, also a violation of Rule 14 (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
2004: 154). 
4  I am sympathetic to the attempt to account for the persuasive nature of fallacies. Note that a different 
way of accounting for the persuasive aspects of many fallacies is provided by the theory of strategic 
maneuvering (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002).  
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according to the pragma-dialectical commandments for critical discussion, it is not allowed 
to falsely present a proposition as a common starting point. Thus, falsely presenting a 
premise as a common starting constitutes a type a fallacy (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
1992: :151-154). Second, there are norms of optimality, which distinguish between speech 
acts that are of better quality from those that are of poorer quality. The latter are weak 
moves, and possibly even blunders. For example, even if a premise of an argument has not 
been falsely presented as a common starting point, it can still fail to be a common starting 
point, and thereby constitute a weak (but non-fallacious) part of the argument. Third, there 
are institutional norms, which distinguish between moves that are appropriate within a par-
ticular type of (more or less institutionalized) context from those that are inappropriate. For 
example, even though it can be a common starting point that the defendant has stated that 
he is guilty, the premise that expresses this common knowledge can still be inappropriate 
for the reason that this evidence is legally inadmissible, for example by being obtained 
from an illegally taped conversation. These errors can be labeled (institutional) faults.  
 Another example of a fault seems to be provided by Battersby and Bailin in the 
legal example of the evidence that, in the judge’s eye, is too persuasive for the jury, and 
that might therefore hinder the jury in arriving at a reasoned judgment. The judge seems 
to be afraid that the jury will make an argumentative mistake by conceiving of the argu-
ment at hand as decisive, thereby assigning insufficient weight to other relevant consider-
ations. In other words, the judge wants to avoid the jury to commit the fallacy of jumping 
to a conclusion. Apparently, there is an institutional rule that the judge can appeal to 
when dismissing such evidence as “prejudicial.” 
 To conclude, the evaluation of an argument extends beyond fallacy analysis, and 
includes judgments of argumentative weakness and of institutional fault. 
4. THE DIALECTICAL NATURE OF FALLACIES 
The dialectical approach of the authors can be extended, along lines indicated by Ham-
blin (1970: Chapter 9), by accepting a consequence of conceiving of “fallacy” as an eval-
uative term, rather than as a descriptive one. 
 The expression “fallacy identification” suggests that fallacy analysis may result 
in a neutral list of the errors that have been committed within a text or speech. Brian 
Yoder makes fun of this assumption when referring to his online catalogue of fallacies, 
by writing: “Brian doesn't like illogical arguments, so he has collected some dangerous 
fallacies and put them behind bars where you can safely view them in his Fallacy Zoo.”5  
 In contradistinction to such a perspective, Hamblin proposes in his last chapter 
of the book “Fallacies” to view “[fallacy of] equivocation” not as a description of a par-
ticular erroneous argumentative species, but as a point of order, by which someone can be 
charged of having committed a particular kind of argumentative mistake. To “identify a 
fallacy” in an argument is, in this view, a way to criticize that argument in a particular 
manner. To state that an argument constitutes a particular fallacy, is to make a charge 
against that argument. An argument is, or is not, a fallacy-according-to-someone. Accord-
ing to such a full-fledged dialectical perspective on fallacies, fallacy charges themselves 
are dialogical contributions and can be evaluated as such. Given the threefold distinction 
                                                 
5  http://home.earthlink.net/~byoder/ 
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discussed earlier, a fallacy charge could be wrong in the sense of being an institutional 
fault, or an argumentatively weak move, or, indeed, a fallacious move itself.  
 Battersby and Bailin are on this track when they explain how to respond to falla-
cies. The requirements they formulate on fallacy charges are plausible ones: make it clear 
what is wrong with the fallacy, but refrain from name calling and keep focused on the 
issue at hand, in order to invite the other side to proceed with the discussion. 
 Hamblin’s view suggests that skills in argument evaluation are, in addition, fur-
thered by inviting students to critically assess the fallacy charges. By critically assessing 
fallacy charges, students are forced to get a clear view of the characteristics of the various 
types of fallacy, and of the clauses of the accompanying definitions. Thus, the dialogues 
of the authors, which end in an adequate response to an alleged fallacy, should be extend-
ed with a move in which fallacy charge is challenged and critically tested. 
 
B:  Vote for my party! 
A:  You are a hypocrite. (Plausibly, a kind of ad hominem fallacy.)6 
B:  This isn’t about me. This is about the policies advocated by my party. (An admissi-
ble critical response to the alleged fallacy; More in particular, a fallacy charge.) 
A:  Since I must vote for a person, I am entitled to require him to be trustworthy. 
(An admissible critical response to the fallacy charge.) 
 
By teaching fallacies in such a dialectical manner, one conveys the message that fallacy judg-
ments can be expected to be themselves matters of contention. A central task of argumenta-
tion theory should be to develop the means with which discussants can debate themselves what 
the merits are of their arguments and of the moves with which they evaluate their arguments. 
5. CONCLUSION 
First, fallacy analysis may play a role both in early and in more advanced stages of argu-
ment evaluation. Second, a complete evaluation of an argumentative text or speech also 
includes the identification of argumentative weaknesses and of institutional faults. Third, 
teaching fallacy analysis can be done in a dialectical fashion by examining both how to 
raise constructive fallacy charges and how to challenge such fallacy charges.  
REFERENCES 
Eemeren, F.H. van, and Grootendorst, R. (1992). Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies: A  
Pragma-Dialectical Perspective. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Eemeren, F.H. van, and Grootendorst, R. (2004). A Systematic Theory of Argumentation. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press. 
Eemeren, F.H. van, and Houtlosser, P. (2002). Strategic manoeuvring in argumentative discourse: A  
delicate balance. In: Eemeren, F.H. van, and Houtlosser, P. (eds.), Dialectic and Rhetoric: The Warp 
and Woof of Argumentation Analysis (pp. 131-159). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. 
Hamblin, C.L. (1970). Fallacies. London: Methuen. 
Krabbe, E.C.W., and Laar, J.A. van (2011). The Ways of Criticism. Argumentation 25, 199-227.  
                                                 
6  According to Battersby and Bailin, in order for an ad hominem fallacy to be a fallacy, it must instantiate 
a particular argument pattern. Unfortunately, it has not been made clear by the authors what argument 
pattern an ad hominem fallacy such as this one exhibits. 
